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Abstract
We study the model robustness against adversarial examples,
referred to as small perturbed input data that may however
fool many state-of-the-art deep learning models. Unlike pre-
vious research, we establish a novel theory addressing the
robustness issue from the perspective of stability of the loss
function in the small neighborhood of natural examples. We
propose to exploit an energy function to describe the stability
and prove that reducing such energy guarantees the robust-
ness against adversarial examples. We also show that the tra-
ditional training methods including adversarial training with
the l2 norm constraint (AT) and Virtual Adversarial Training
(VAT) tend to minimize the lower bound of our proposed en-
ergy function. We make an analysis showing that minimiza-
tion of such lower bound can however lead to insufficient ro-
bustness within the neighborhood around the input sample.
Furthermore, we design a more rational method with the en-
ergy regularization which proves to achieve better robustness
than previous methods. Through a series of experiments, we
demonstrate the superiority of our model on both supervised
tasks and semi-supervised tasks. In particular, our proposed
adversarial framework achieves the best performance com-
pared with previous adversarial training methods on bench-
mark datasets MNIST, CIFAR-10, and SVHN. Importantly,
they demonstrate much better robustness against adversarial
examples than all the other comparison methods.
Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have achieved
great success in various tasks, such as speech
recognition, image classification, and object
detection (LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton 2015;
He et al. 2017). However, recent research shows that
certain small perturbations over the input samples, called
adversarial examples, may fool many powerful deep
learning models (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014).
To better handle the adversarial perturbation, there
have been many seminal works studying how to
generate adversarial examples. For example, Liu et
al. presented a simple way called L-BFGS method
to generate such examples (Liu and Nocedal 1989).
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) was later pro-
posed, which can also generate the adversarial per-
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turbation (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014).
Lyu et al. and Shaham et al. further extended
the FGSM to more general cases with the lp
norm constraint (Lyu, Huang, and Liang 2015;
Shaham, Yamada, and Negahban 2015), where FGSM
can be seen as the adversarial training method with l∞
norm. Kurakin et al. attempted to utilize the projected
gradient on the negative loss to find the worst perturbation
called FGSMk (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016),
which can be viewed as the multi-step version of FGSM.
Focusing on studying the gradient of the loss function, these
three methods showed their effectiveness in improving the
model robustness on both natural and adversarial examples
by data augmentation with adversarial examples.
On the other hand, for defending the adversar-
ial attack, defensive distillation and feature squeez-
ing were investigated (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2017;
Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016). Furthermore,
Virtual Adversarial Training (VAT) can generate adversarial
perturbation without label information (Miyato et al. 2015;
Miyato et al. 2018). More specifically, the objective of
VAT is to smooth the output distribution by minimizing
the divergence between outputs of natural examples and
adversarial examples. In addition, Kos et al. proposed
methods to generate the adversarial examples for generative
models (Kos, Fischer, and Song 2018).
In parallel to studying how adversarial examples
can be generated, researchers also made great efforts
in thinking about the theory and principles underlying
the adversarial examples. In particular, Ma et al. have
shown that adversarial examples are not isolated points
but a dense region of the input space (Ma et al. 2018).
Fawzi et al. studied the model robustness against ad-
versarial examples by establishing a general upper
bound (Fawzi, Moosavi-Dezfooli, and Frossard 2016;
Fawzi, Fawzi, and Frossard 2018). Finlay et al. and
Lyu et al. have demonstrated that FGSM and their
extended general cases can be interpreted as a form
of regularization (Finlay, Oberman, and Abbasi 2018;
Lyu, Huang, and Liang 2015). Similarly, Cisse et al.
showed that the sensitivity to adversarial examples can be
controlled by the Lipschitz constant of the network and
proposed a new structure of network which is insensible to
adversarial examples (Cisse et al. 2017).
The above-mentioned seminal studies have got interesting
and important results for trying to understand adversarial ex-
amples. Although some theoretical robustness bounds have
been proposed, most are practically difficult to be used or be
optimized. Moreover, less theories have been rigorously of-
fered on measuring the model robustness against adversarial
examples mathematically and systematically.
Distinguished from these existing work, in this paper, a
novel theoretical framework has been established which is
able to address the robustness issue mathematically and rig-
orously.
In more details, inspired from the stability of the loss
function in the small neighborhood of natural examples,
we propose to exploit an energy function to describe the
stability, and we prove that reducing such energy guaran-
tees the robustness against adversarial examples. We also
prove that many traditional adversarial training methods
(including both supervised and semi-supervised adversarial
training) are essentially equivalent to minimizing the lower
bound of the proposed energy function; such low bound
minimization can however might lead to insufficient robust-
ness within the neighborhood around the input sample. Fur-
thermore, we design a more rational and practical method
with the energy regularization which proves to achieve bet-
ter robustness than previous methods.
In addition, we develop the robustness analysis on
both traditional supervised and semi-supervised adversarial
learning, which is, to our best knowledge, rarely seen in the
literature.
Finally, to verify the performance of the proposedmethod,
we have conducted a series of experiments for both su-
pervised and unsupervised tasks. Experimental results have
shown that our proposed adversarial framework can achieve
the best performance compared with previous adversar-
ial methods benchmarked on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and
SVHN. Importantly, they demonstrate much better robust-
ness against adversarial examples than all the other compar-
ison methods.
Notations and Backgrounds
We denote by Dtrain a training set containing N samples,
namely Dtrain = {xi, yi|i = 1, ..., N}, where xi ∈ RI in-
dicates an input sample (or natural sample) and yi ∈ RO de-
notes its corresponding label (with I and O representing the
dimension of the input space and the output space, respec-
tively). We also define B(xi, ǫ) as an I-dimensional small
ball around each xi with the radius ǫ.
Given a specific type of DNN, we let f(x, θ) : RI →
RO denote its mapping function (implicitly or explicitly),
L(x, y, θ) be the loss function used by the DNN, and θ be a
set of parameters which is to be optimized over Dtrain for
the DNN. For simplicity, L(x, y, θ) could be written in short
as L(x, θ) or even L(x), so do some other similar notations.
Moreover, we assume in this paper that the last layer of the
DNN be a softmax layer, but it should be noted that other
functions can also be used.
Adversarial Training with the l2 Norm Constraint
The adversarial training method with the l2 norm constraint
(AT) is a supervised method, which attempts to find the
worst perturbed example in the neighborhood of a natural
example to mislead the classification. Such perturbed ex-
amples are then augmented into the training set for train-
ing a better DNN. The objective of this adversarial training
method can be written as:
min
θ
max
x∈B(x0,ǫ)
L(x, y, θ), (1)
where x indicates the perturbed version of a natural example
x0 (with the label y) within a small neighborhood B(x0, ǫ)
(which is defined by ‖x− x0‖2 ≤ ǫ).
Virtual Adversarial Training
Different from the adversarial training method with the l2
norm constraint (AT), Virtual Adversarial Training (VAT)
does not require the label information. It tends to find the
worst perturbed example near a natural example so that the
output of DNN f(x, θ) can be altered. The corresponding
objective is defined as:
min
θ
max
x∈B(x0,ǫ)
D(f(x0, θ), f(x, θ)), (2)
where D(f(x0, θ), f(x, θ)) denotes the divergence be-
tween the outputs f(x0, θ) and f(x, θ). For simplicity,
D(f(x0, θ), f(x, θ)) is defined in this paper as the Euclidean
distance between the outputs, i.e., ‖f(x0, θ)−f(x, θ)‖2, but
it is straightforward to extend the Euclidean distance to other
divergence measures.
Main Methodology
We first present a reasonable assumption.
Assumption 1: Given a sensible loss function L(x, y, θ) :
RI → R for a specific learning task, we assume that, there
exists a small threshold σth, such that those inputs x satisfy-
ing L(x, y, θ) ≤ σth can be correctly classified.
Note that such an assumption generally holds for common
loss functions such as the cross entropy and the square error.
A detailed analysis on the assumption can be seen in the ap-
pendix of the supplementary materials. With the above nota-
tions and assumptions, the adversarial training problem can
be described as follows.
Problem Formulation: Assume that a natural example x0
satisfies L(x0, y0, θ) ≤ σ1 where σ1 << σth, i.e., the ex-
ample x0 can be classified correctly with a high confidence.
An adversarial example xad is then defined as the worst per-
turbed sample such that L(xad, y0, θ) > σth, i.e., xad will
be mis-classified. The objective of adversarial training for a
specific x0 can be reformulated as
min
θ
max
x∈B(x0,ǫ)
|L(x, y, θ)− L(x0, y, θ)|.
Robustness Against Adversarial Examples
Before we interpret our robustness analysis against adver-
sarial examples, we set out Lemma 0.1 as follows:
Lemma 0.1 Given a natural example x0 satisfying
L(x0, y0, θ) ≤ σ1 (where 0 ≤ σ1 << σth), if
∀x ∈ B(x0, ǫ), ∃σ2 : 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ σth − σ1, it holds
that
|L(x, y0, θ)− L(x0, y0, θ)|≤ σ2 , (3)
then, all the data points in B(x0, ǫ) can be classified cor-
rectly.
The proof is provided in the appendix of the supplementary
materials.
Lemma 0.1 states that, if the loss of data points nearby x0
is sufficiently close to that of x0, then all these data points
can be classified correctly, since the natural example x0 has
been already classified correctly with a high confidence. In
other words, whether the nearby points around x0 can be
classified correctly is affected by the stability of the loss
function L(x, y, θ) in the region B(x0, ǫ). We also say that
L(x, y, θ) is robust in the regionB(x0, ǫ), and thus there ex-
ist no adversarial examples in this region, since all the data
in this region are classified into the same category.
Remark. Previous research studies the adversarial ex-
amples mainly through considering whether the adversar-
ial perturbation can guide the natural example to cross the
classification boundary in a less rigorous way. Moreover, it
would be difficult to investigate the shape of the classifica-
tion boundary when data lie in a high dimensional space. In
comparison, we consider in this paper the robustness against
adversarial examples from the perspective of the loss func-
tion stability, which would lead to strict analysis as follows.
In order to describe the stability ofL(x, y, θ) in the neigh-
borhood of x, we propose the following novel energy func-
tion as given in Definition 0.6.
Definition 0.1 Let L : RI → R be a differential and inte-
gral function and B(x0, ǫ) be a small neighborhood of x0
with radius ǫ. Then, the energy of L(x) in this neighborhood
is defined as:
EB(θ) =
∫
B
||∇xL(x, θ)||2dV, (4)
where V denotes the volume.
This energy describes a metric measuring the stability of a
function, i.e., how a function would change within a small
region defined by B(x0, ǫ). More precisely, the integral of
the l2 norm of the gradient of the loss with respect to the in-
put x measures how the loss function changes at each point
in B(x0, ǫ). Intuitively, if the variation on each point is not
large, the loss functionwould not change dramatically in this
neighborhood of each point. This means that the loss func-
tion would be more stable. Importantly, we will prove that
minimizing such energy function can guarantee the robust-
ness for adversarial examples in B(x0, ǫ). Before that, we
provide Lemma 0.2.
Lemma 0.2 Let B(x0, ǫ) ∈ RI be a small neighborhood
of natural example x0 with label y0, and x be an arbi-
trary point within B(x0, ǫ). If the value of energy EB(θ) =∫
B
‖∇xL(x, θ)‖2dV decreases, then the number of exam-
ples classified correctly in B(x0, ǫ) increases. When the en-
ergy goes to zero, the number of adversarial examples in
B(x0, ǫ) goes to zero.
Proof of Lemma 0.2 is provided in the appendix of the sup-
plementary materials.
Lemma 0.2 shows that decreasing the energy function
leads to increasing the number of points x such that |L(x)−
L(x0)| ≤ σth inB(x0, ǫ). In other words, a more number of
points in B(x0, σ) would be correctly classified according
to Lemma 0.1. When the energy function is small enough,
there would be no adversarial examples gradually. There-
fore, this novel energy function can be used to measure the
robustness against adversarial examples in B(x0, ǫ).
New Insight to Traditional Adversarial Methods
In this subsection, using our proposed stability measure, we
provide interpretations as well as new insight to the previous
traditional adversarial training methods including both su-
pervised and semi-supervised version (Adversarial Training
with l2 norm constraint and VAT). Moreover, we prove that
these traditional adversarial training methods are just to min-
imize the lower bound of the proposed energy along the ra-
dius, which however leads to insufficient robustness against
adversarial examples. Such disadvantages will be analyzed
and we then propose a more rational and practical optimiza-
tion method.
First, we set out Definition 0.2 to describe the notion of
the energy function along the radius.
Definition 0.2 Let the spherical coordinate of x ∈ B(x0, ǫ)
be (r, φ) where r ∈ [0, ǫ] and φ ∈ [−π, π]I−1. Then, the
energy along radius on φ is defined by
Eǫ(φ) =
∫ ǫ
0
||∇xL(r, φ)||2dr. (5)
The energy Eǫ is defined in the spherical coordinate system
and describes the total variation of the functionL(r, φ) along
the radius at angle φ. We present Lemma 0.3 for a further
explanation.
Lemma 0.3 Let B(x0, ǫ) ∈ RI be a small neighborhood
of natural example x0 with label y0 and xad ∈ B(x0, ǫ)
such that |L(xad) − L(x0)| ≥ |L(x) − L(x0)| for all x ∈
B(x0, ǫ). Suppose that xad is on the boundary of B(x0, ǫ1)
(ǫ1 ≤ ǫ) and the spherical coordinate of point xad can be
expressed by (ǫ1, φ1)where φ1 ∈ [−π, π]I−1. Then, we have∫ ǫ
0
||∇xL(r, φ1)||2dr ≥ |L(xad)− L(x0)|. (6)
(Proof is provided in the appendix of the supplementary ma-
terials).
It is easy to reformulate the adversarial train-
ing method with l2 norm constraint (AT) as fol-
lows (Lyu, Huang, and Liang 2015):
min
θ
max
x∈B(x0,ǫ)
|L(x, θ)− L(x0, θ)|
= min
θ
|L(xad, θ)− L(x0, θ)|.
(7)
Remark. If we compare Eq. (7) with inequality (6), it can be
noted that this traditional adversarial training method with l2
norm constraint (AT) is equivalent to minimizing the lower
bound of the energy Eǫ(φ1).
Only when the adversarial example is on the boundary of
B(x0, ǫ) and the functionL(r, φ1) is monotonically increas-
ing w.r.t r, the traditional adversarial training method can be
equivalent to minimizing the energyEǫ itself. Unfortunately,
it is surely not guaranteed that the adversarial example is
always on the boundary and the function L(r, φ1) always
monotonically increases, when ǫ increases.
Similarly, we can also prove VAT is equivalent to min-
imizing a lower bound of the energy along the radius at a
certain angle φ. Before the proof, we present Lemma 0.4.
Lemma 0.4 Let B(x0, ǫ) ∈ RI be a small neighborhood of
natural example x0 with label y0 and xva ∈ B(x0, ǫ) such
that ‖f(xva) − f(x0)‖2 ≥ ‖f(x) − f(x0)‖2 for all x ∈
B(x0, ǫ). Suppose that xva is on the boundary of B(x0, ǫ1)
(ǫ1 ≤ ǫ) and the spherical coordinate of point xva can be
expressed by (ǫ1, φ2)where φ2 ∈ [−π, π]I−1. Then, we have∫ ǫ
0
||∇xf(r, φ2)||2dr ≥ ‖f(xva)− f(x0)‖2 (8)
(Proof is provided in the appendix of the supplementary ma-
terials).
On the other hand, we can readily reformulate the VAT
as (?):
min
θ
max
x∈B(x0,ǫ)
‖f(x, θ)− f(x0, θ)‖2
= min
θ
‖f(xva, θ)− f(x0, θ)‖2
(9)
Remark. If we compare Eq. (9) with Inequality (33), it
can be noted that VAT is equivalent to minimizing the lower
bound of energy Eǫ(φ2).
Similarly, only when the adversarial example is on the
boundary of B(x0, ǫ) and the function f(r, φ2) monotoni-
cally increases, the VAT would be exactly equivalent to min-
imizing the energy Eǫ(φ2).
In summary, although the previous adversarial training
methods could achieve good performance on both natu-
ral examples and adversarial examples, there are some in-
herit drawbacks. Note that the traditional adversarial train-
ing methods minimize the lower bound of the energy func-
tion each iteration which can reduce the value of the energy
function to some degree. However, it cannot ensure the value
of energy small enough. Intuitively, the traditional methods
just consider the worst point in B(x0, ǫ) which cannot re-
strict the total variation in neighborhood of x0. This may
ignore some other potential risk points. To illustrate this, We
show in Fig. 1 that, even when the risk of the worst point
has been reduced, the traditional methods could not guaran-
tee the robustness against adversarial examples.
In Fig. 1, the loss for the worst point xadv in B(x0, ǫ)
has been reduced to a small enough value (below the risk
threshold θth). However, there exists also a small region
R1 ∈ B(x0, ǫ) (the region in blue circle) such that |L(x) −
L(x0)| ≥ σth where x ∈ R1, which means the examples
in region R1 are not guaranteed to be classified correctly
according to the assumption mentioned before. According
Figure 1: Illustration of the functionL(x)w.r.t input xwhere
x is 2-dimensional. x0 is a natural example and the red cir-
cle denotes its neighborhood B(x0, ǫ). The region in the
blue circle represents the risk region where the points cannot
be guaranteed to be classified correctly (L(x) ≥ σth). The
black curve connecting x0 and x1 is the function L(r, φ)
w.r.t r, and Eǫ(r, φ) is the corresponding energy.
to Fig. 1, for the traditional methods, minimizing L(xad)
certainly cannot guarantee reducing the overall variations
within all the nearby points as defined by the energy func-
tion given by Eq. (4). Therefore, there might exist other risk
points. For tackling this problem, we additionally restrict
the energy function (the total variation) within the neigh-
borhood of natural example x0. Note that although the
traditional methods minimize the loss function of differ-
ent worst points for different iterations, sometimes finite
points might be insufficient to guarantee the robustness.
For our method, we additionally use the information of
the first derivative to improve the stability (information
of the first derivative might not solve the whole problem
but alleviate it).
However, it is difficult to minimize the function of Eq. (4),
since it requires the computation of integration. Instead, we
propose in the following a more practical algorithm that is
able to achieve the same objective. We first present Theo-
rem 0.5.
Theorem 0.5 Let B(x0, ǫ) ∈ RI be a small neighbor-
hood of natural example x0 with label y0 and x be an
arbitrary point in B(x0, ǫ). If the value of the energy
EB(θ) =
∫
B
‖∇xL(x, θ)‖2dV decreases, the value of the
energy Eǫ(φ, θ) =
∫ ǫ
0
||∇xF (r, φ, θ)||2dr decreases almost
everywhere in [−π, π]I−1. When the energy EB(θ) goes to
zero, the energy Eǫ(φ, θ) goes to zero almost everywhere in
[−π, π]I−1.
(Proof is provided in the appendix of the supplementary ma-
terials.)
In the above, for a measurable set E, we say that a prop-
erty holds almost everywhere on E, or it holds for almost
all x ∈ E, provided there is a subset E0 of E for which
m(E0) = 0 (m(E0) denotes the measure for E0 and the
property holds for all x ∈ E − E0.
Theorem 0.5 states that decreasing the total energy EB
can lead to a reduction of the energy along the radius Eǫ.
Therefore, we can reduce all of Eǫ by penalizing the total
energy EB . This naturally leads to a new method to enrich
the traditional adversarial methods with energy regulariza-
tion. We describe this new method as follows.
min
θ
max
x
L(x, θ) + λmin
θ
∫
B
||∇xL(x, y, θ)||2dV. (10)
In (10), the second term presents the energy regularization
which is defined by the energyEB , and λ is a positive trade-
off hyper-parameter. Again, the energy function describes
the overall variation of L(x) in the neighborhood, which
is significantly distinguished from those traditional methods
acting merely on a single point. According to Lemma 0.2
and Theorem 0.5, reducing the energy EB leads to decreas-
ing the number of adversarial examples as well as the energy
Eǫ. Intuitively, penalizing the total variations of the function
L(x, y, θ) can help avoid the dramatic fluctuation of the loss
function as illustrated in Fig. 1.
However, the optimization problem (10) is again im-
practical since the second term requires integration. For
convenient optimization, we change the second term with
maxx∈B ||∇xL(x, y, θ)||2 which is closely related to the up-
per bound of EB and Eǫ in the sense that minimizing the
term is equivalent to minimizing the upper bound ofEB and
Eǫ:
min
θ
max
x∈B
L(x, θ) + λmax
x∈B
||∇xL(x, y, θ)||2. (11)
This new regularization can also be extended to VAT:
min
θ
max
x∈B
D(f(xi, θ),f(xi + ǫvat, θ))
+ λmax
x∈B
||∇xf(x, θ)||2.
(12)
Again, our proposedmethod is equivalent to decreasing both
the lower bound and upper bound of energy Eǫ. Relevant
proof and details can be seen in the appendix of the supple-
mentary materials.
Practical Optimization Algorithm
We design practical optimization algorithms for our pro-
posed new framework, which basically extends the previ-
ous methods with the novel energy regularization. For con-
venience, we start with the problem (11), while the prob-
lem (12) can be solved in a similar way. In the prob-
lem (11), the first term can be solved with the tradi-
tional adversarial training method. The second term can
be divided into two problems: inner maximization prob-
lem and outer minimization problem. However, for the
inner problem, since ‖∇xL(x, y, θ)‖2 is a non-convex
function, it is difficult to evaluate the maximizer of
function ‖∇xL(x, y, θ)‖2. Following many similar ap-
proaches (Lyu, Huang, and Liang 2015), we relax it to the
convex problem with the first order Taylor expansions:
max
x∈B(x0,ǫ)
||∇xL(x0, y0, θ)||2
+∇x‖∇xL(x0, y0, θ)‖T2 (x− x0).
(13)
The problem (34) is now a convex problemw.r.t x and can
be solved by Lagrangian multiplier method. The maximizer
can be calculated as:
xmax = ǫ∇x‖∇xL(x0, y0, θ)‖2 + x0, (14)
where . represents the normalized operator. The gradient of
‖∇xL(x0, y0, θ)‖2 w.r.t x is difficult to compute. We can
use the finite difference method to approximate it:
xmax = ǫ∇x‖∇xL(x0, y0, θ)‖2 + x0
= ǫH(x0)∇xL(x0) + x0
≈ ǫ∇xL(x0 + ξ∇xL(x0))−∇xL(x0)
ξ
+ x0,
(15)
where ξ is a small value. In this paper, we set ξ = 10−6.
More details of derivation of (37) are provided in the ap-
pendix. After computing the maximizer xmax of inner prob-
lem, the outer problem can be solved by the gradient decent
method. The whole algorithm of Adversarial Training with
Energy Regularization we called in short ATER is shown in
Algorithm 1. We also develop the VAT with Energy Regu-
larization (in short VATER) which is put in the appendix of
the supplementary materials.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for ATER.
1: for number of training iterations do
2: Sample a batch of labeled data (xi, yi) with size N .
3: for i in 1...N do
4: dai ← ∇xL(yi, xi, θ)
5: ǫiadv = ξd
a
i
6: dei ← ∇xL(xi+ξ∇xf(xi))−∇xL(xi)ξ
7: ximax = ǫd
e
i + xi
8: end for
9: Update the parameters of neural network with
stochastic gradient:
10: −∇θ 1N
∑N
i=1 logL(yi, xi, θ) −
∇θ 1N
∑N
i=1 logL(yi, xi + ǫiadv, θ) −
∇x 1N
∑N
i=1 ‖∇θL(ximax, yi, θ)‖2
11: end for
Experiments
We evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed methods in-
cluding Adversarial Training with Energy Regularization
(ATER) and Virtual Adversarial Training with Energy Reg-
ularization (VATER) on datasets MNIST, CIFAR-10 for su-
pervised tasks and we exploit SVHN additionally for semi-
supervised tasks following the experimental setting used in
the most related work (Miyato et al. 2018). Specifically, for
MNIST, we apply the conventional fully connected neu-
ral network with the same setting as (Miyato et al. 2018).
The number of units in the hidden layers are set to
{1, 200, 600, 300, 150} and the activate function is relu
with batch normalization for each layer. We have con-
ducted the experiments for the proposed ATER and VATER
in comparison with the baseline model and various tra-
ditional adversarial training methods. For the hyper pa-
rameter λ in (11) and (12), we simply set it to 0.1 em-
pirically. For CIFAR-10 and SVHN, we utilize the struc-
ture called ’conv-large’ following (Miyato et al. 2018). We
use the 50, 000 labeled samples of CIFAR-10 to train this
model and test with 10, 000 samples for the supervised
task. For these two datasets the hyper-parameter λ is set
to 0.5. Note that the best hyper-parameters are chosen from
{0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, 1.0} empirically.
Method MNIST
SVM 1.40
Dropout (Srivastava et al. 2014) 1.05
Ladder networks (Rasmus et al. 2015) 0.57(±0.02)
Adversarial,
L∞ norm constraint
(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) 0.78(±0.03)
Adversarial,
L2 norm constraint (Miyato et al. 2017) 0.71(±0.03)
RPT (Miyato et al. 2017) 0.82
Baseline 1.11(±0.06)
VAT 0.64(±0.05)
ATER 0.57(±0.03)
VATER 0.55(± 0.02)
Table 1: Test error rate (%) onMNIST in supervised learning
Method CIFAR-10
Network in Network
(Lin, Chen, and Yan 2013) 8.81
All-CNN (Springenberg et al. 2014) 7.25
Deeply Supervised Net (Lee et al. 2015) 7.97
Highway Network
(Srivastava, Greff, and Schmidhuber 2015) 7.72
RPT (Miyato et al. 2017) 6.25± 0.04
ResNet (1,001 layers) (He et al. 2016) 4.62± 0.2
DenseNet (190 layers) (Huang et al. 2017) 3.46
Baseline 6.76± 0.07
VAT 5.81± 0.05
Baseline+l2 adversarial 5.82± 0.04
ATER 5.43± 0.05
VATER 5.20± 0.05
Table 2: Test error rate % on CIFAR-10 in supervised learn-
ing
Table 1-2 show the results of different models on MNIST
and CIFAR-10 respectively for the supervised task. With-
out tuning the parameter λ, our proposed methods already
achieve the best performance on MNIST dataset over all the
other algorithms. On CIFAR-10, our proposed adversarial
method VATER performs the best among all the adversarial
methods, but worse than the DenseNet and ResNet, which
exploit a much deeper architecture. In future, we can also
apply our method on such deeper structures to investigate if
further improvements can be obtained.
To further examine if the proposed methods can be
more robust to the adversarial examples, we generate in
the test datasets of MNIST and CIFAR-10 10,000 ad-
versarial examples according to FSGM and 2-norm at-
tacks (Lyu, Huang, and Liang 2015) respectively. We in-
crease the level of adversarial noise gradually from 0 to
8 in MNIST (with the step size as 1) and from 0 to 13
in CIFAR-10 (with the step size as 1.6). We then test the
performance of various methods on these adversarial exam-
ples. The performance is plotted in Fig. 2. As clearly ob-
served, the proposed VATER and ATER show much better
robustness against two types of adversarial examples. Par-
ticularly, when the adversarial noises are small, all the ad-
versarial training methods show similar results but perform
much better than the CNN (exploiting no adversarial train-
ing); when the adversarial noises are heavier, the proposed
VATER and ATER demonstrate clearly better performance,
verifying their significant robustness.
In summary, for all the experiments, our proposed meth-
ods achieve superior performance than all the traditional ad-
versarial training methods. We attribute this success to the
additionally penalizing of the upper bound of the energy
function that can reduce the overall variation in the neigh-
borhoodB(x0, ǫ). In comparison, the traditional adversarial
methods just consider to reduce the loss for the adversarial
examples. Moreover, the experiments indicate that the first
derivative of the loss L(x) w.r.t input x can provide more
information.
Table 3: Test performance on SVHN in semi-supervised
learning
Method
SVHN (1,000 labeled)
Test error rate(%)
SWWAE (Zhao et al. ) 23.56
Skip Generative Model
(Maaløe et al. 2016) 16.30
GAN with feature matching
(Salimans et al. 2016) 8.11
Π model (Laine and Aila 2016) 5.43
RPT (Miyato et al. 2017) 8.41(±0.24)
VAT 5.77(±0.32)
VATER 4.92(±0.10)
Table 4: Test performance on CIFAR-10 in semi-supervised
learning
Method
CIFAR-10 (4,000 labeled)
Test error rate(%)
Ladder networks, Γ model
(Rasmus et al. 2015) 20.40
CatGAN (Springenberg 2015) 19.58
GAN with feature matching
(Salimans et al. 2016) 18.63
Π model (Laine and Aila 2016) 16.55
RPT (Miyato et al. 2017) 18.56(±0.29)
VAT 14.82(±0.38)
VATER 12.53(±0.23)
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Figure 2: Performance of various methods on different adversarial attacks. VATER and ATER show the best robustness. Better
viewed in color.
Table 3-4 demonstrate the results of different models on
SVHN and CIFAR-10 for semi-supervised learning. For the
semi-supervised task, we just apply our proposed method
VATER since it is an unsupervised adversarial training
method. As observed, our model again attains the best per-
formance on both the two datasets.
Taking the example of CIFAR-10, we evaluate the con-
vergence performance of our proposed models as well as
their robustness against adversarial examples generated by
AT. Both the evaluations are based on the supervised setting.
We plot the convergence curves for our proposedmethods
in Figure 3. Particularly, the figure shows the error rate for
the different methods on both the training set and test set.
The red lines indicate the convergence curves for our pro-
posed methods (VATER and ATER) on the test set. The blue
ones present the curves of the traditional adversarial train-
ing methods (VAT and AT). Although the training curves
are similar, our proposed methods attain better convergence
than their traditional counterparts on the test set.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the model robustness against ad-
versarial examples from the perspective of function stability.
We develop a novel energy function to describe the stability
in the small neighborhood of natural examples and prove
that reducing such energy can guarantee the robustness for
adversarial examples. We also offer new insights to tradi-
tional adversarial methods (AT and VAT) showing that such
traditional methods merely decrease certain lower bounds
of the energy function. We analyze the disadvantage of the
traditional methods and propose accordingly more rational
methods to minimize both the upper bound and lower bound
of the energy function. We implement our methods on both
supervised and semi-supervised tasks and achieve superior
performance on benchmark datasets.
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Appendix
Analysis for Assumption 1 in Section 3.1
In this section, we prove that for common loss functions
(e.g., cross entropy and square error) we can find a small
constant σth such that if L(x, y, θ) < σth, then the input
x can be classified correctly. In this paper, we assume the
last layer the softmax layer, then we have
∑
i yi = 1 and
yi ∈ [0, 1].
Cross Entropy Loss
The cross entropy loss is defined as Lce = −
∑
i lilog(yi)
where l = {li}Oi=1 (O is the output dimension) is an one
hot label vector for input x1. We assume la = 1 and oth-
ers are zeros which means x belongs to class a. Then, we
can reformulate the cross entropy loss as Lce = −logya. If
Lce(x1, l) < σth for all 0 < σth < −log0.5, x1 can be
classified correctly.
Proof:
Lce < σth < −log0.5 (16)
then we have
−logya < σth < −log0.5
⇒ ya > e−σth > 0.5
(17)
Since
∑
i yi = 1 and ya > e
−σth > 0.5, x1 can be classified
correctly.
Square Error Loss
The square error loss can be formulated as Lse =∑
i(yi − li)2. Similarly, for the square error loss Lse, If
Lse(x1, l) < σth for all σth < 0.25, x1 can be classified
correctly.
Proof:
∑
i
(yi − li)2 < σth (18)
Since la = 1 and others are zeros, then we have∑
i/a
(yi)
2 + (ya − 1)2 < σth
⇒ (ya − 1)2 < σth < 0.25
⇒ ya > σth > 0.5
(19)
Since
∑
i yi = 1 and ya > 1 −
√
σth > 0.5, x1 can be
classified correctly.
Proof for Lemmas
In this section, we prove the lemmas in the main paper. For
convenience, we first set out some Theorem and Lemma.
Theorem 0.6 Let B ∈ Rn and f : Rn → R and g : Rn →
R are integrable and continues functions, then there exists a
constant c such that∫
B
f(x)g(x)dV = c
∫
B
g(x)dV (20)
where V is the volume and
∫
B
g(x)dV 6= 0.
Proof:
We can directly find constant c:
∫
B
f(x)g(x)dV∫
B g(x)dV
= c (21)
Lemma 1. Let us define g : Rm → R by g(θ) =∫
B
f(x, θ)dV where f : RI → R is differential and in-
tegrable. Then, if g(θ) decreases and goes to zero, f(x, θ)
decreases and goes to zero almost everywhere in B.
(Def. For a measurable set E, we say that a property holds
almost everywhere on E, or it holds for almost all x ∈ E,
provided there is a subset E0 of E for which m(E0) = 0
(m(E0) denotes the measure for E0) and the property holds
for all x ∈ E − E0).
Proof:
Let N0 = {x|f(x) ≥ n0} where n0 is a sufficiently small
value.
g(θ) =
∫
B
f(x, θ)dV
=
∫
N0
f(x, θ)dV +
∫
B−N0
f(x, θ)dV
≥
∫
N0
f(x, θ)dV
(22)
When g(θ) decreases and goes to zero,
∫
N0
f(x, θ)dV
decreases and goes to zero. Then the measure of N0
(m({x|f(x) ≥ n0})) decreases and goes to zero which
means the measure ofB−N0 (m({x|f(x) < n0})) increases
and goes tom(B). Therefore, f(x, θ) decreases and goes to
zero almost everywhere in B.
Proof for Lemma 3.1
Lemma 3.1. Given a natural example x0 satisfying
L(x0, y0, θ) ≤ σ1 (where 0 ≤ σ1 << σth), if ∀x ∈
B(x0, ǫ), ∃σ2 : 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ σth − σ1, it holds that
|L(x, y0, θ)− L(x0, y0, θ)|≤ σ2 , (23)
then, all the data points in B(x0, ǫ) can be classified cor-
rectly.
Proof:
In this paper, we have proved in the previous section that
there exists a σth such that if L(x, y, θ) ≤ σth, x can be
classified correctly. Additionally, we assume that the natu-
ral examples can be classified correctly with a high confi-
dence (L(x0, y0, θ) ≤ σ1 << σth). Then, if L(x, y0, θ) <
L(x0, y0, θ),
L(x, y0, θ) < σ1 < σth (24)
which means x can be classified correctly.
If L(x, y0, θ) > L(x0, y0, θ)
|L(x, y0, θ)−L(x0, y0, θ)|
= L(x0, y0, θ)− L(x0, y0, θ)
< σ2 < σth − σ1
⇒ L(x0,y0, θ) < L(x0, y0, θ) + σ2 < σth
(25)
Therefore, if |L(x0, y0, θ) − L(x0, y0, θ)|≤ σ2, x0 can be
classified correctly.
Proof for Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4
Here, we just prove Lemma 3.4 since Lemma 3.3 is a special
case of Lemma 3.4.
Lemma 3.4. Let B(x0, ǫ) ∈ RI be a small neighborhood
of natural example x0 with label y0 and xva ∈ B(x0, ǫ)
such that ‖f(xva) − f(x0)‖2 ≥ ‖f(x) − f(x0)‖2 for all
x ∈ B(x0, ǫ). Suppose that xva is on the boundary of
B(x0, ǫ1) (ǫ1 ≤ ǫ) and the spherical coordinate of point
xva can be expressed by (ǫ1, φ2) where φ2 ∈ [−π, π]I−1.
Then, we have∫ ǫ
0
||∇xf(r, φ2)||2dr ≥ ‖f(xva)− f(x0)‖2 (26)
Proof:
∫ ǫ
0
||∇xf(r, φ2)||2dr ≥
∫ ǫ1
0
||∇xf(r, φ2)||2dr
≥
∫ ǫ1
0
||∇xf(r, φ2) · −→d ||2dr
≥ ||
∫ ǫ1
0
∇xf(r, φ2) · −→d dr||2
= ‖f(xva)− f(x0)‖2
(27)
where,
−→
d is the unit vector pointing from x0 to xva. In the
same way, we can prove Lemma 3.3.
Proof for Lemma 3.2
Lemma 3.2. Let B(x0, ǫ) ∈ RI be a small neighbor-
hood of natural example x0 with label y0 and xar be ar-
bitrary point in B(x0, ǫ). If the value of energy EB(θ) =∫
B
‖∇xL(x, θ)‖2dV decreases, the number of examples
classified correctly in B(x0, ǫ) increases. When the energy
goes to zero, the number of adversarial examples inB(x0, ǫ)
goes to zero.
Proof:
we reformulate the energy in spherical coordinate:
EB =
∫
B
||∇xL(x)||2dV
=
∫
SI−1
∫ ǫ
0
||∇xL(r, φ)||2rI−1drdφ
(28)
According to Theorem 2.1, there exists a constant r1 such
that∫
B
||∇xL(r,φ)||2dV
= r1
∫
SI−1
∫ ǫ
0
||∇xL(r, φ)||2drdφ
(29)
According to Lemma 3.4, we have
r1
∫
SI−1
∫ ǫ
0
||∇xL(r, φ)||2drdφ
≥ r1
∫
SI−1
|L(ǫ1, φ)− L(x0)|dφ
(30)
where ǫ1 ≤ ǫ and (ǫ1, φ) is the spherical coordinate
of arbitrary point x. Since EB is the upper bound of∫
SI−1
|L(ǫ1, φ) − L(x0)|dφ, when EB decreases and goes
to zero,
∫
SI−1
|L(ǫ1, φ) − L(x0)|dφ decreases and goes to
zero. According to Lemma 1, for almost all xar ∈ B,
|L(xar) − L(x0)| decreases and goes to zero which means
the number of adversarial examples inB decreases and goes
to zero (according to Lemma 3.1).
Proof for Theorem 3.5
Theorem 3.5. Let B(x0, ǫ) ∈ RI be a small neigh-
borhood of natural example x0 with label y0. and xar
be arbitrary point in B(x0, ǫ). If the value of energy
EB(θ) =
∫
B ‖∇xL(x, θ)‖2dV decreases, the value of en-
ergy Eǫ(φ, θ) =
∫ ǫ
0 ||∇xF (r, φ, θ)||2dr decreases almost
everywhere in [−π, π]I−1. When the energy EB(θ) goes to
zero, the energy Eǫ(φ, θ) goes to zero almost everywhere in
[−π, π]I−1.
Proof:
Similar to Lemma 3.2, there exists a constant r1 such that∫
B
||∇xL(r,φ)||2dV
= r1
∫
SI−1
∫ ǫ
0
||∇xL(r, φ)||2drdφ
= r1
∫
SI−1
Eǫ(φ)dφ
(31)
According to Lemma 1, when EB(θ) decreases and
goes to zero, for almost all φ ∈ [−π, π]I−1, Eǫ =∫ ǫ
0
||∇xF (r, φ)||2dr deceases and goes to zero.
Details of Practical Algorithm
In this paper, we minimize both the upper bound and lower
bound of energy Eǫ. The algorithm to minimize the lower
bound is the same as the traditional adversarial training.
Here, we only give the relevant proof and algorithm for the
upper bound of Eǫ and EB:
The upper bound for EB:
EB =
∫
B
||∇xL(x)||2dV
≤
∫
B
max
x∈B
‖∇L(x)‖2dV
= max
x∈B
‖∇L(x)‖2 · V ol(B)
(32)
The upper bound for Eǫ:
Eǫ =
∫ ǫ
0
||∇xL(r, φ)||2dr
≤
∫ ǫ
0
max
x∈B
‖∇L(x)‖2dr
= max
x∈B
‖∇L(x)‖2 · ǫ
(33)
Since V ol(B) and ǫ are constants, reducing
maxx∈B ‖∇L(x)‖2 is equivalent to decreasing the up-
per bound of Eǫ and EB .
The problem (13) in the main paper can be reduced to:
max
‖r‖p=ǫ
∇xFT r (34)
where, r = x − x0 and F = ‖∇xL(x0, y0, θ)‖2. We solve
it with the Lagrangian multiplier method and we have
∇xFr = λ(‖r‖p − ǫ)
Then we make the first derivative with respect to r:
∇xF = λ r
p−1
p(
∑
i r
p
i )
1− 1
p
∇xF = λ
p
(
r
ǫ
)p−1
(∇xF)
p
p−1 = (
λ
p
)
p
p−1 (
r
ǫ
)p (35)
If we sum over two sides, we have
∑
(∇xF)
p
p−1 =
∑
(
λ
p
)
p
p−1 (
r
ǫ
)p
‖∇xF‖p
∗
p∗ = (
λ
p
)p
∗ ∗ 1
where p∗ is the dual of p. ( 1p +
1
p∗ = 1)
(
λ
p
) = ‖∇xF‖p∗ (36)
By combining (35) and (36), we have
r∗ = ǫsign(∇F)( |∇F|‖∇F‖p∗ )
1
p−1
In this paper, p = 2, then we have
r∗ = ǫ(
∇F
‖∇F‖2 )
= ǫ∇x‖∇xL(x0, y0, θ)‖2
Therefore, the maximizer xmax can be calculated as:
xmax = r
∗ + x0 = ǫ∇x‖∇xL(x0, y0, θ)‖2 + x0
∇x‖∇xL(x0, y0, θ)‖2 can be calculated as:
∇x‖∇xL(x0)‖2
= [
∂‖∇xL(x0)‖22
∂x1
,
∂‖∇xL(x0)‖22
∂x2
, ...,
∂‖∇xL(x0)‖22
∂xI
] · 1
2‖∇xL(x0)‖2
=
1
‖∇xL(x0)‖2 [
I∑
i=1
∂∇xL(x0)
∂xi
∂∇xL(x0)
∂xi∂x1
,
I∑
i=1
∂∇xL(x0)
∂xi
∂∇xL(x0)
∂xi∂x2
, ...,
I∑
i=1
∂∇xL(x0)
∂xi
∂∇xL(x0)
∂xi∂xI
]
=
1
‖∇xL(x0)‖2 ·H(x0)∇xL(x0)
Then, using the finite difference method, we have
1
‖∇xL(x0)‖2 ·H(x0)∇xL(x0)
≈ 1‖∇xL(x0)‖2 ·
∇xL(x0 + ξ∇xL(x0))−∇xL(x)
ξ
where ξ is small value (ξ = 10−6). Since 1‖∇xL(x0)‖2 is
scalar, we have
xmax ≈ ǫ∇xL(x0 + ξ∇xL(x0))−∇xL(x0)
ξ
+ x0 (37)
Algorithm for VATER
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for VATER.
1: for number of training iterations do
2: Sample a batch of labeled data (xl, yl) with size Nl
and a batch of unlabeled data (xul) with size Nul. Zli
denotes the matrix of latent features of data with label i
in a batch.
3: for j in 1...n do
4: d← ∇xD(f(xi, θ), f(xi + r, θ))|ǫ=ξd
5: end for
6: ǫvat = ξd
7: dei ← ∇xf(xi+ξ∇xf(xi))−∇xf(xi)ξ
8: ximax = ǫd
e
i + xi
9: Update the parameters of neural network with
stochastic gradient:
10:
11: −∇θ{ 1N
∑N
i=1 L(xi, yi, θ) − D(f(xi, θ), f(xi +
ǫvat, θ))− λ‖∇xf(ximax, θ)‖2}
12: end for
